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The Repercussions of Russian and Ukrainian Conflict 




Republic of Moldova’s realistic analysis of its security is required to be addressed in terms of geopolitical and geographical 
position. However Moldova is a state of a geopolitical border, with direct border with the EU and NATO on the one hand and 
indirect with the Russian Federation, on the other hand. Thus, Moldova ‘s geopolitical position is totally different on the grounds 
that is in the area of vital geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation and also near other areas listed above. Moldova’s 
geopolitical situation is disadvantaged in terms of perception that the Russian Federation has on the post- Soviet space 
(abroad), that are regarded as exclusive spheres of interest. 
The events in eastern part of Ukraine caused by Russian-Ukrainian contradictions have a direct impact on regional security. 
This article will analyze the impact of the Russian and Ukrainian crises on the security of the Republic of Moldova. 
Keywords: conflict, geopolitical interest, geostrategic interests, hibrid war, interest sphere, international relations, 
security, strategy.
Introduction
A realistic vision of Moldovan security should be addressed 
by geographical and geopolitical position. However Moldo-
van geopolitical position is specific, if we take into account 
all aspects and regional variables (Ukraine, the Black Sea, 
Caucasus, Middle East etc.). However Moldova is a state of a 
geopolitical border, with direct border with the EU and NATO 
on the one hand and indirect with the Russian Federation, on 
the other hand. Thus, Moldova’s geopolitical position is totally 
different on the grounds that is in the area of vital geopolitical 
interests of the Russian Federation and also near other ar-
eas listed above. Moldova’s geopolitical situation is disadvan-
taged in terms of perception that the Russian Federation has 
on the post- Soviet space (near abroad), that are regarded as 
exclusive spheres of interest.
The Repercussions of Russian and 
Ukrainian Conflict on Security of the 
Republic of Moldova 
The regional context develops the geopolitical position of 
Moldova in the light of certain risks and opportunities. As a 
result of recent events in the regional context, it was shown 
that the security of the Republic of Moldova is directly influ-
enced by Ukraine’s security and vice versa. Moldova’s inter-
est is that Ukraine doesn’t go under the control of Moscow, 
although Kiev lost Crimea and they fight with separatists in 
southeast part of the country. Ukraine’s entry under Russian 
control assumes the whole Moldova will be under the same 
control.  Even if Ukraine and Moldova are two countries with 
different characteristics (territory, population, economy, state 
power), they are regarded as block (joint) by Moscow, and 
the giving up of one country supposes the giving up of the 
other, and because of the position he holds Moldova, Mol-
dova feels protected in some way from Ukraine. Thus, given 
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the geopolitical context of the region, the security of Moldo-
va deserves to be analyzed in the light of events in Ukraine. 
 The Ukrainian crises  which began in early  November 2013, 
on the eve of the Eastern Partnership Summit from 28-29 
November in Vilnius under which Ukraine had to sign the 
Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union has 
a strong impact on Moldova. The dramatic destabilization 
of the political situation in the neighboring country creates a 
very dangerous regional context for unpredictable develop-
ments. Thus, according to opinion of the President-in-Office 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Ivica Dacic, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, the crisis in 
Ukraine has a disastrous effect on the frozen conflicts in the 
region, such as in Transnistria. However, OSCE Chairman 
expressed concern about the breaking on the Transnistrian 
conflict settlement process in the 5 + 2 format (Botan I, 
2014) 
   For several years Russia questions the scaffolding of 
international relations and forces a change in the rules of 
the game and the balance of forces in the region. From the 
time of the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and the military 
aggression in the eastern part of Ukraine under the pretext 
of the unilateral defense of the Russians, Russian 
speakers and compatriots the Russian Federation tends to 
recreate the Soviet Union or even seizure of territories 
inhabited by majority of Russians or citizens nostalgic for 
the USSR. The annexation of Crimea, in the opinion of 
Francisco de Borja Lasheras is the third warning (made by 
Russia) to ex-Soviet states such as Moldova not granted 
security guarantees and that, however try to swing to the 
West. This view contrasts sharply with the rather optimistic 
approach of Nicu Popescu. According to him, the EU 
succeeded in approaching “new won friends “, Moldova 
being a part of an ultimate “concentric circle of friends 
“along with Ukraine and Georgia. 
So, the crisis in Ukraine and the collapse of European 
Security System essentially changes the way in which Mol-
dova is to understand its own security, exponentially amplify-
ing the threats and risks. In this context, the last great suc-
cesses of Chisinau - Association Agreement in June 2014 
and the obtaining of  liberalized visa regime in April – could 
be seen not only as turning points of entry in a free and safer 
world but also as risks that increase the insecurity in the 
country. At the same time, we should mention that in con-
ditions of Moldova’s high dependence on external factors 
such decisions were taken by the realization that any alter-
native solution poses risks at least as great. Therefore, the 
crisis in Ukraine has outlined a number of worrying trends for 
Moldova, whose main parameters are as follows:
Moldova entered the geopolitical logic track of “either, 
or”, being forced to choose between two divergent integra-
tion projects - either the European Union or the Eura-
sian Economic Union. Thesetwo major projects withifferent 
ideoloogies and principles recededfrom fair competition and 
turned into some direct geopolitical confrontation ge-
nerators, front line passing through Ukraine.  Russia and 
the West tend to consolidate their positions in already 
conquered areas, and attempts to find the denominator are 
motivated by the desire to minimize the risks, not returning 
to the idea of “common spaces”. 
a) Moldova gradually loses the ability to influence the
events taking place in its own territory and around it, 
entering the sign “controlled chaos”. The State becomes 
vulnerable to challenges from abroad, over which it 
doesn’t exercise control and can produce devastating 
consequences. This feeling of constant exposure to diffuse, 
vague, and undefined hazards can be reflected by the 
impact that had on Moldova’s society the events of May 2, 
2014 in Odessa, which they perceived as a direct threat. 
Nevertheless, external actors are more and more tempted 
to use the tools of the “controlled chaos” for creating 
intrusion gaps.
b) The established regularities disappear and are deva-
lued the entrenched negotiation formats. Moldova is 
entering a period  in which, without clear rules of the 
game, is forced to improvise. For example, the referendum 
on the development vector of the Republic of Moldova, 
held in the Administrative Territorial Unit Gagauzia on 
February 2, 2014 and subsequently declared un-
constitutional, deformed the model of collaboration bet-
ween Chisinau and Comrat. Moreover, the referendum 
made the Government react ad hoc, by actions which 
were frequently at the limits of the acceptable, such as 
the initiation of criminal cases and the detention of 
individuals from the region. At the same time, although 
stagnating and doesn’t approach the issues related to the 
status of Transnistria, the ‘5+2’ format is constantly 
challenged by some guarantees and undertakes Chisinau
and Tiraspol to think about its conservation, even if for the 
moment is sentenced to inefficiency. 
c) Takes place the degradation of security soft mecha-
nisms which, under conditions of acute polarization of inte-
gration vectors, are seen as the main means of maintaining 
the balance. The Association Agreement, which is expected 
to strengthen the Moldovan society, has generated a deeper 
division of the society, creating instability in various regions 
of the country - Tiraspol, Comrat, Balti, Taraclia, Ocniţa etc. 
Also, the European Integration of Moldova - although is seen 
as a soft way of attraction, by improving living standards, of 
Transnistria in the legal field of Chisinau failed to reduce the 
tension between the two borders. Thus, according to some 
analyzes, the European integration enters in conflicts with 
the country’s reintegration process. Reducing the role of the 
security soft mechanisms and return to the political-military 
dimension can be deduced from the decline, in public per-
ception, of the importance of corruption factor in defining 
threats to the Moldova’s security. The same can be found 
in the case of mass media influence - ceasing transmission 
of some TV channels is not necessarily an appropriate re-
sponse to the political and military threats. 
We observe a continuous reduction of the autonomous 
decision-making capacity by the Moldovan authorities. This 
is noted in particular, in case of official visits of Russian politi-
cians or when we encounter the government’s inability to op-
pose economic embargoes. For example, the government 
isn’t able to cope with the challenges posed by external 
factors such as blocking of Moldovan agricultural products 
export to Russia. Neither the referendums in ATU Gagau-
zia, despite their unconstitutionality, couldn’t be thwarted. In 
such circumstances, there is an erosion of public confidence 
in government’s ability to manage internal crisis, which may 
lead to a gradual de-legitimating Power. An indirect indica-
tion of the inability of decision-making can be sluggishness 
of European reform process. Even in the face of more se-
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rious attempts than those been for Moldova, these trends 
increase the strategic problem of security providing, 
respectively rallying to one of two mentioned above 
alternative op-tions – Coevolution and coexistence with 
Russia and its isolation and containment. Both options are 
considered and there is not yet a clearcut decision in this 
regard, which confirms the state of confusion in which our 
country is. The trend of rallying of the Republic of 
Moldova to Russia’s isolation policy can be deduct from 
several actions taken recently by the government in 
Chisinau: the detention of a number of individuals from 
Transnistria and Gagauzia; the expulsion of some Russian 
citizens; the introduction at the beginning of 2014 of 
excise duties imposed on imports from Transnistria; the 
strengthening of military capabilities and increasing range 
of military applications (even if their goal was clearly 
defensive), the investigation of an obstruction campaign of 
pro-Russian political parties and the suspension of transmis-
sion of a Russian news channel; the refusal to open addi-
tional polling stations in Russia; the support of Ukraine in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. At the same 
time, Moldova often was distinguished by applying a 
moderation policy, trying to avoid its attraction into an 
antagonistic policy towards Russia. Thus, despite Russia’s 
hostile actions - first of all, the blocking of Moldovan 
exports and giving up de facto of the Free Trade 
Agreement within the CIS - Chisinau has maintained 
constantly the desire not to admit the degeneration of the 
dialogue with Moscow. The Moldovan government didn’t 
rallied to sanctions imposed by the Western countries to 
Russia, didn’t accepted the idea of physical blockage of 
Transnistria, respectively to prohibit citizens from the left 
bank to leave the country through Chisinau Air-port. 
Obviously, the Moldovan policy in relation to Russia was 
different from that of Ukraine, our country managed to 
avoid a series of excesses characteristic to the 
neighboring state. However, Chisinau couldn’t avoid 
sanctions from Moscow, which was caused by the lack of 
interest of Russia for a positive agenda with Moldova. This 
situation contrasts more with the relationship between 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, involving trilateral 
negotiations on the EU Association Agreement, and such 
- reflects Moscow’s interest to cooperate with Kiev. Under 
these conditions Chisinau risks to become a “scapegoat” 
that the Kremlin will make it responsible for “losses” 
incurred by Moscow and Tiraspol in their relations (EVZ. 
RO. Chifu I. 2015).
The conflict in Ukraine has a direct impact on the situa-
tion in Moldova. The situation in eastern Ukraine could qual-
ify the development of the following scenarios in Moldova: 1) 
A hybrid war in Gagauzia - patterned of Russian aggression 
in Donbas; 2) Transnistria attacking Moldova; 3) Russian at-
tack on Ukraine’s Odessa, held from East, along the 
Black Sea coast in the direction of Mariupol - Crimea -
Odessa, or landing at sea from the south, possibly a 
concentric com-bination of two variants with a blow 
related to the Ukrain-ian forces from Transnistria. Such an 
operation would open Russian military communication to 
Transnistria , which has just been cut by Ukraine , and 
would undoubtedly lead to the taking control of Bugeac , in 
such way breaking Dniester barriers and exposing Moldova 
to an attack not only from the east - from Transnistria , but 
from the south too, while paving the way to Gagauzia 
bordering  with Bugeac and easily be provoked to revolt. 
The events in Ukraine have strong im-
pact on Moldova. The dramatic destabilization of the 
political situation in the neighboring country creates a very 
dangerous regional context for unpredictable develop-
ments.
Moldovan national security is affected in several dimen-
sions. The main actors in the Transnistrian settlement 
pro-cess, mediators and guarantees resolving the situation 
be-came enemies, and the subject of the conflict - 
Transnistria - claims the fate of Crimea, resorting to one of 
safeguards, which seized a part of the territory of the other 
guarantor. In addition, the regulatory process in the “5 + 
2” takes place under the auspices of the OSCE security 
architecture which was destroyed.
In the context of events in Ukraine the economic securi-
ty of the Republic of Moldova deserves attention, which is af-
fected by pressures from its strategic partner – Russian 
Federation. This was admitted by the Russian Deputy Pri-
me Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who after his visit to Moldova 
in May 2014, acknowledged that the embargo imposed 
Moldovan wine exports in September 2013 is of political 
nature to discourage European integration. In such cir-
cumstances it is necessary exacerbating the polarization of 
the public opinion and the political class of the European 
integration versus Eurasian integration. The sympathies of 
citizens are already been divided in equal proportion, a 
tight score of results between those two camps could 
cause dissatisfaction of those brought to limit, expressed 
through protest actions, disobedience and so on until the 
scenarios to destabilize the internal political situation after 
well-known models. Recently the US President Barack 
Obama stated that the United States would provide $ 1 
billion to strengthen security in the Eastern Europe, in a 
project that would include Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
(Asociaţia pentru Democraţie Participativă “ADEPT”, 2015).
Ukrainian crisis has dramatically destabilized the re-
gional situation, with potentially profound destabilization of 
the international political situation. Violation of a basic princi-
ple of  the international law by Russia annexing the Crimea 
provoked the response of the West - to impose sanctions 
gradually to a “ strategic partner “ that gradually can turn 
in an enemy , with all the negative consequences that may 
follow:
1. The annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federa-
tion has created a precedent without an equivalent in the 
postwar period. Regional Security Architecture, established 
40 years ago and secured by OSCE, with the necessary 
adjustments after the dissolution of the USSR and the other 
federal states, has been damaged, without any indication 
that it can be repaired yet. Discussions on regional security 
architecture will be possible only as a result of preparatory 
work and some mutual concessions, which will take time 
and conditions for a return to a degree of partnership be-
tween the West and Russia. The provisions of the Constitu-
tion of the Russian Federation do not provide possibilities 
for disposal Crimea, this meaning that the return to status 
quo ante annexation. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
repair of the architecture of regional security of  postwar 
be impossible, requiring the design of new architectures, 
on principles which follow to be developed and articulated 
with the identification of guarantees for  great actors, but 
also for vulnerable subjects;
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become enemies, and the subject of the conflict - the fate 
of Transnistria claims the Crimean use one of safeguards, 
which annexed a part of the territory of the other guarantor. 
In addition, the regulatory process “5 + 2” takes place under 
the auspices of the OSCE security architecture which was 
demolished;
3. The economic security of the Republic of Moldova
deserves attention, which is affected by pressures from its 
strategic partner – Russian Federation. This was admitted 
by the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who 
after his visit to Moldova in May 2014, acknowledged that 
the embargo imposed Moldovan wine exports in September 
2013 is of political nature, to discourage European integra-
tion. In such circumstances it is necessary exacerbating the 
polarization of the public opinion and the political class of the 
European integration versus Eurasian integration. The sym-
pathies of citizens are already been divided in equal pro-
portion, a tight score of results between those two camps 
could cause dissatisfaction of those brought to limit, ex-
pressed through protest actions, disobedience and so on 
until the scenarios to destabilize the internal political situ-
ation after well-known models. Război cu Rusia (Scenariu 
românesc,  2015).
Conclusion
In terms of EU enlargement to the East, the US involvement 
in resolving conflicts on the international arena and the Rus-
sian Federation trends to maintain its sphere of influences 
to the ex - Soviet republics such as Ukraine or Moldova are 
obvious. In this way analyzing the geopolitical and geostra-
tegic interests of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine, 
we find that they are determined by the following needs of 
Russia: keeping Russia’s strategic position in South-East 
Europe and preventing the EU and NATO enlargement to 
the East. In this context, the Russian-Georgian crisis has 
a direct impact on the security of the Republic of Moldova. 
Coming out from the situation in the region but also to miti-
gate the negative effects that could influence Moldova, there 
arises the need to optimize and secure the border area of 
Ukrainian - Transnistrian segment. Also, in order to diminish 
but even to avoiding some dangers to state security would 
be welcome for the leadership of Moldova to enhance coop-
eration with the government from Kiev in the political sphere. 
In this context, Kiev should support the efforts of Moldova’s 
territorial integration, the support must be mutual.  No less 
important in solving problems concerning national security, 
it is to intensify the cooperation of Moldova with European 
structures, which are guaranteed in preventing the outbreak 
of conflict in the Transnistrian region, but also from other 
regions of Moldova.
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2. Moldova’s national security is affected in several di-
mensions. The main actors in the Transnistrian settlement 
process - the mediators and settlement guarantees have 
